INTRODUCTION
Among the greatest challenges faced by society today is the threat of anthropogenic climate change. Its economic costs alone could be 5 to 20 per cent of global production. 1 These costs will be disproportionately borne by the world's vulnerable populations. In addition, there will be non-economic costs, such as human suffering and loss of biodiversity. 2 Estimates of the likely impact of climate change have become increasingly dire. 3 Unfortunately, there is little reason for optimism. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, the cause of anthropogenic climate change, continue to rise. 4 Models which extrapolate current activities estimate that average global warming will double the oft-cited 2°C target limit by the end of the century. 5 International agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have had limited results. 6 These efforts face difficult problems not only of coordination, collective action and free-riding, but also of global and intergenerational equity and justice. 7 In response to the risks of climate change, academics and policymakers have considered increasingly drastic measures. For example, advocates of reducing greenhouse gas emissions were originally concerned that their efforts would be undermined by public discussion of adapting society to a different climate. Now, however, both emissions reductions and adaptation are generally considered to be the two pillars of effective climate change policy. 8 A third potential set of responses to the threat of climate change is increasingly entering public debate. Climate engineering, or geoengineering, 9 is a group of proposals to intentionally intervene in global physical, chemical and biological systems on a massive scale in order to reduce the threat of anthropogenic climate change. These proposals carry their own risks and have been controversial and, until recently, open discussion of climate engineering has been limited.
Although there is near unanimous agreement that deployment of climate engineering should be regulated, there is wide variation as to whether regulation is feasible and, if so, how it should be done. Various authors have ranged from concluding that climate engineering will inevitably be prohibited 10 to arguing that it cannot be controlled. 11 had been the consensus of industrialised countries, but was recently challenged by leaders of various developing nations who called for a lower limit. Elected lawmakers appear reluctant to address it, and an earlier attempt at self-regulation stumbled. 12 A new effort, the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, seeks to tackle this problem by focusing on only one of the two main categories of climate engineering, and on only matters of research, not of deployment. Will this approach help or hinder the initiative in the attempt to surmount some of the regulatory challenges presented by climate engineering?
This essay seeks to answer this question by exploring climate engineering and its regulatory challenges. Part I introduces the history and proposed forms of climate engineering, in particular distinguishing its two primary categories. Part II provides an overview of various international legal instruments that may be relevant to climate engineering, and concludes that one of the two primary forms is largely addressed by existing legal instruments. Part III describes how climate engineering's technical, environmental and political characteristics engender regulatory challenges, which are mostly distinct between its two primary forms. Part IV explores the logic and legal basis of regulation of scientific research, in general, and the implications for the regulation of climate engineering research. Part V highlights specific strengths of and challenges to the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, focusing on legitimacy and the definition of research. Part VI offers a brief concluding summary.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE ENGINEERING
The consideration of climate engineering is historically intertwined with the awareness of anthropogenic climate change. Soon after Svante Arrhenius proposed that industrial emissions of carbon dioxide may warm the climate, his 'good friend' Nils Ekholm proposed that such emissions would be beneficial, and could be increased. 13 The first government report on the threat of anthropogenic climate change, submitted to US President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, recommended increasing the earth's reflectivity by using buoyant ocean particles, yet it did not consider reducing fossil fuel consumption. 14 In 1977, leading Soviet climatologist Mikhail Budyko proposed what remains the most widely discussed climate engineering method: injecting aerosols into the stratosphere. 15 The term 'geoengineering' was coined soon thereafter, in the context of deep ocean storage of carbon dioxide. 16 A 1992 major climate change report from the US National Academies included a chapter on climate engineering. 17 By the next decade, an internal US government white paper had suggested a $64 million climate engineering research initiative, but the White House rejected this on political grounds. 18 The academic and public debates about climate engineering have grown dramatically in the last five years. 19 The breakthrough was a pair of editorials in 2006 by atmospheric chemists, one a Nobel Laureate and the other the president of the US National Academy of Science. 20 In the last two years, the UK Royal Society, the US National Research Council, the UK Institution of Mechanical Engineers, and committees of the UK Parliament and the US Congress issued reports, and the American Meteorological Society and the American Geophysical Union released statements, all of which called for climate engineering research. 21 Recently, modest research projects began to receive funds, both publicly, from the European Union and the United Kingdom, and privately, from billionaires Bill Gates and Richard Branson. 22 The leading body responsible for assessing climate change 16 Cesare Marchetti, 'On Geoengineering and the CO 2 Problem ' (1977) 
II. CURRENT RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Building on the foregoing introduction to climate engineering, this part reviews some relevant international legal instruments. 35 Although no such international agreements directly address climate engineering, some have applicable provisions whose relevance varies among the proposed climate engineering methods. In general, international legal instruments are more applicable to CDR than to SRM. The leading climate change treaty is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose objective is the 'stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. 36 It makes repeated references to the removal of greenhouse gases by sinks, and to the enhancement thereof. 37 Whereas its definition of sink as 'any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere' seems to include CDR, the UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol-currently the primary platform of national commitmentslimits credit for emission reduction via sinks to 'human-induced land-use change and forestry activities'. 38 Climate engineering proposals to fertilise oceans in order to increase biological carbon dioxide uptake, which have already been the focus of around a dozen field trials, 39 are subject to existing international agreements. Most importantly, fertilisation could be considered ocean dumping. Whether a particular form of ocean dumping is prohibited under the London Convention and its London Protocol, which regulate the practice, depends upon, inter alia, the action's purpose, quantity, and potential for harm. 40 Following controversy surrounding ocean fertilisation field trials, 41 the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which administers the Convention and Protocol, resolved that ocean fertilisation does fall within the treaties' scope, and that fertilisation, other than 'legitimate scientific research', should currently not be permitted. 42 It later developed a framework tool for assessing whether a proposed activity is 'legitimate scientific research'. 43 Due to its broad mandate and the risks to biodiversity from climate change, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) may be relevant to climate engineering. In particular, its parties must work to '[p]revent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species'. 44 ocean fertilisation, which typically operates by creating algal blooms. Responding to the ocean fertilisation field trials, in 2008 the parties to the CBD took a firmer position than that of the IMO, requesting that ocean fertilization activities do not take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these activities; with the exception of small scale scientific research studies within coastal waters. 45 This apparent divergence between the IMO and the CBD continued in 2010. Just after the former released its framework assessment for legitimate ocean fertilisation research, the parties to the CBD broadened their call, inviting [p] arties and other Governments … to consider [e]nsur[ing] … in the absence of science based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geoengineering, and in accordance with the precautionary approach and Article 14 of the Convention, that no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural impacts, with the exception of small scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the environment. 46 In a footnote, the statement defined that any technologies that deliberately reduce solar insolation or increase carbon sequestration from the atmosphere on a large scale that may affect biodiversity (excluding carbon capture and storage from fossil fuels when it captures carbon dioxide before it is released into the atmosphere) should be considered as forms of geo-engineering which are relevant to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 47 Compared to CDR, SRM is poorly addressed by international legal instruments. For example, the Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the military use of 'the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space'. However, it explicitly permits peaceful activities. 48 The most widely discussed SRM proposal, stratospheric aerosol injection, could potentially be interpreted as air pollution, albeit intentional. The Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution is of limited applicability, as it is weak, focuses on only Europe's air quality, and addresses pollution 'which has adverse effects … at such a distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources'. 49 Sulfate is presently the most likely candidate for aerosol injection, and the Convention's sulfur Protocols, while requiring parties to reduce sulfur emissions, do not prohibit intentional releases. 50 Furthermore, the amount of sulfate to be injected under stratospheric aerosol injection would be small relative to that from 'unintentional' pollution. 51 Customary international law, under which states generally have duties to minimise transboundary harm and to cooperate in mitigating risks, would likely be more relevant. 52 Finally, stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection could damage the ozone layer, which is already thinned. 53 A thinner ozone layer would allow more ultraviolet radiation to reach the earth's surface, creating risks to the environment and human health. The Montreal Protocol is currently phasing out certain substances which contribute to this depletion. 54 Although the Protocol uses a 'black list' of prohibitions which does not include sulfates, deployment of or research into stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection could instigate action.
III. REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Although some existing international legal instruments may be applicable to climate engineering, as outlined in the previous section, significant regulatory gaps clearly remain. This section describes how the technical, environmental and political characteristics of 55 Royal Society (n 21) xi. 56 'By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the technology is often so much part of the whole economics and social fabric that its control is extremely difficult. This is the dilemma of control. When change is easy, the need for it cannot be foreseen; when the need for change is apparent, change has become expensive, difficult and time consuming. climate engineering contribute to regulatory challenges and thus make filling these gaps difficult.
The UK Royal Society's report concluded that '[t]he greatest challenges to the successful deployment of geoengineering may be the social, ethical, legal and political issues associated with governance, rather than scientific and technical issues'. 55 Fortunately, however, presently there are opportunities to identify the challenges, to examine existing law, and to propose and implement new regulatory instruments before risks are borne and any technologies may become locked-in. In short, this is the technology control dilemma: Early on, the risks and negative consequences of a new, powerful technology are poorly known while appropriate regulation is relatively easy to implement. As the risks become clearer, regulation becomes more difficult to enact. 56 The regulatory challenges vary among the proposed climate engineering methods, and are greater for-and often exclusive to-SRM compared to CDR. 57 In fact, the Royal Society asserted that 'CDR technologies could mostly be adequately controlled by existing national and international institutions and legislation'. 58 Steve Rayner described this as the 'geoengineering paradox':
The technology that seems to be nearest to maturity and could technically be used to shave a few degrees off a future peak in anthropogenic temperature rise [ie SRM by stratospheric aerosol injection] is likely to be the most difficult to implement from a social and political standpoint, while the technology that might be easiest to implement from a social perspective and has the potential to deliver a durable solution to the problem of atmospheric carbon concentrations [ie ambient air capture CDR] is the most distant from being technically realized. 59 Some CDR methods which are labelled 'climate engineering' differ little from the enhancement of natural sinks, except in their proposed scale. 60 As with sink enhancement, 61 Contracting parties to the London Convention and contracting parties to the London Protocol (n 42 and n 43). 62 A report of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission concluded that 'even using the highest estimates for both carbon export ratios and atmospheric uptake efficiencies, the overall potential for ocean fertilization to remove CO 2 from the atmosphere is relatively small'. these methods will require determinations as to whether they qualify as carbon credits, a process which can be managed using existing legal instruments and institutions. In some cases of CDR, local law can adequately deal with environmental concerns, such as how to store captured carbon dioxide. An exception is enhanced maritime storage, particularly through ocean fertilisation, which is associated with greater environmental risks which are transboundary in character. However, even ocean fertilisation is being addressed through the London Convention and Protocol, 61 even though it may not be an effective CDR method. 62 Furthermore, those difficulties that are held in common by both SRM and CDR may not be of the sort to be addressed through regulation. For example, one common concern is that climate engineering is not merely a distraction from addressing the causes of climate change, but presents a 'moral hazard' which will weaken incentives for emissions cuts and adaptation. 63 Although almost all climate engineering researchers and advocates repeatedly emphasise the primacy of emissions cuts, 64 a handful assert that climate engineering could be a substitute. 65 There is also the related possibility that climate engineering research is a slippery slope to deployment, 66 68 Because, in general, CDR appears to be able to be adequately controlled through existing instruments, this essay will henceforth focus on SRM.
The scientific characteristics of climate change and the technical characteristics of SRM exacerbate the technology control dilemma. Climate science is 'post-normal' science, in which 'facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent'. 69 Furthermore, SRM presents an extreme case of a risk-risk tradeoff, 70 which makes attempts to apply the precautionary principle ambiguous. 71 It operates in a state of not mere uncertainty, but of ignorance, the condition in which knowledge about both outcomes and their probabilities is low. 72 Finally, climate engineering techniques may be developed and modified rapidly, making a 'connection' between the regulation and technology difficult to maintain. 73 The development of regulation is a political process, yet the mere discussion of climate engineering gives rise to a complicated political landscape. Among environmental advocates, climate engineering (to the extent that it is even discussed) has divided pragmatists, who focus on minimising the impacts of climate change, and 'deeper' Greens, who seek a more modest relationship with the planet. 74 mental groups have often criticised climate engineering but have fallen short of outright condemnation of it or calls for its prohibition. 75 At the other end of the traditional political spectrum, industrial interests that would benefit from continued greenhouse gas emissions have been notably quiet on climate engineering. 76 Some of these have previously denied the threat of anthropogenic climate change; 77 backing climate engineering could be interpreted as a tacit admission. Moreover, public support of climate engineering from such industries may make it even more controversial. Among the public, the prospect of scientists tinkering with the entire planet's climate systems is likely to be greeted with concern and skepticism. 78 Given this complex political landscape, establishing legitimacy will be both crucial and difficult for any regulatory scheme. The regulatory challenges raised by the political characteristics of SRM are most apparent in the deployment context. Various countries and powerful interests would disagree about what climate is ideal, and the possibility of unilateral deployment would make any agreements difficult to maintain. Furthermore, the low estimated financial cost of SRM would enable small nations and non-state actors to implement it. How would the international community manage SRM deployment, some of which could be unauthorised and performed by rogue actors? Furthermore, some parties may feel that they have been harmed by the negative effects of SRM. In these cases, climate counterengineering and militarisation appear possible. Finally, SRM would need to be maintained for a long time-perhaps centuries-because its cessation would result in a dangerously rapid temperature increase. 79 Establishing institutions for such a time scale is obviously challenging, and any parties responsible for SRM maintenance would wield enormous power.
Some challenges to effectively limit the environmental and human health effects of SRM extend from deployment scenarios to field research. This is particularly the case because weather is naturally variable, and thus field trials may need to increase quickly in size in order to produce significant results discernable from background noise. Furthermore, in the case of stratospheric aerosol injection, merely observing whether the particles stay aloft or sink would require large aerosol clouds. Some scientists have gone so far as to assert that 'geoengineering cannot be tested without full-scale implementation'. 80 Because current SRM models predict spatially uneven results and negative side-effects, both deployment and field trials could place the environment and people at significant risk. This will challenge existing international norms of transboundary risk, and raise questions of liability. Furthermore, SRM deployment and large field trials may have entirely unpredicted effects. 81 Populations near test areas will be in a situation similar to that of human biomedical research subjects, yet it is unclear how to apply traditional bioethical principles such as respect for autonomy, beneficence and justice. 82 These risks, both known and unknown, are most apparent in the case of stratospheric aerosol injection, which by its nature will impact a large area. However, smaller scale and more remote methods, such as spraying seawater to increase the brightness of clouds and injecting microbubbles into the ocean, also pose environmental risks. 83 Nevertheless, effective regulation of SRM field research is needed soon. SRM research is crucial in order to improve understanding of possible responses to climate change and to prevent uninformed action in the face of abrupt climate change. Furthermore, scientists are moving rapidly toward SRM field experiments. Calls for coordinated funding of climate engineering research are almost ubiquitous in reports and articles. 84 Some scientists are outlining how a research program could scale up to large outdoor trials. 85 A new project in the UK plans to test aerosol spraying outdoors. 86 A private American company intends to undertake a 10,000km 2 trial of maritime cloud brightening. 87 One Russian team, led by a prominent scientist, has already conducted a small scale field experiment, spraying aerosols into the lower atmosphere. 88 Climate engineering scientists and advocates themselves acknowledge the need for regulation of SRM research. For example, the Royal Society report concluded:
A research governance framework is required to guide the sustainable and responsible development of research activity so as to ensure that the technology can be applied if it becomes necessary. Codes of practice for the scientific community should be developed, and a process for designing and implementing a formal governance framework initiated. 89 Because discussions of SRM deployment quickly raise problematic matters, such as geopolitics, jointly considering the regulation of field research and that of deployment will unnecessarily impede the progress of the former. Efforts toward SRM regulation will thus be more likely to be successful if they are initially limited to matters of field research.
IV. THE REGULATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The previous section demonstrated that effective regulation of climate engineering will be difficult; that the regulatory challenges vary between CDR and SRM, and between deployment and research; and that regulation of SRM field research should be developed first and separately. Before going into further detail, an exploration of the logic and legal basis of regulation of scientific research is warranted.
Any current or proposed regulation of scientific research must address a potential challenge that such research or the communication of its results is protected by fundamental rights, particularly the right to free speech. In general, the case for such protection is weak. For example, while the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights recognises a right 'to share in scientific advancement and its benefits', it does not refer to the actual conducting of scientific research. 90 Although the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union clearly states that 'The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint', this right must be balanced against others. However, the right is yet to be interpreted by the courts due to the newness of the document. 91 In contrast, several international agreements do acknowledge or even regulate certain dangerous or unethical scientific practices. 92 Nationally, claims to US First Amendment protection of research are generally limited to the content of science, not its practice. For example, a seminal paper which asserts a general constitutional right to research concedes that: the right to experiment-the right to select appropriate means of conducting research-is a weaker right than the right to select the end of research. The right to experiment is less absolute: it includes the qualification that although the scientist is free to choose any means of conducting research he thinks scientifically sound, he may not cause direct, substantial harm to the cognizable interests of others. 93 However, even these claims may not withstand scrutiny. 94 There are three sets of reasons to regulate or prohibit certain forms of scientific research. Each has relationships with regulation, rights, and climate engineering. such as biological and nuclear sciences has increased, in some cases resulting in new laws. 95 Similarly, certain topics, such as the relationships among race, genes and intelligence, may have troubling social implications and are often taboo for researchers. 96 A third example is potential breaches of privacy when communicating research results. In this set of reasons for concern, if experiments were to occur but the results never released, there would be no cause for unease. Thus, concern is not with the experiment per se but with the communication of its results. Therefore, relative to the other two categories presented here, the regulation of the publication of results from research which is otherwise permitted would face the strongest criticism that it would violate free speech rights. For climate engineering, the dual-use concerns could possibly be relevant, given the low economic cost of SRM and its potential for militarisation. Perhaps more likely, however, opponents of climate engineering could raise the spectre of the slippery slope, described above, and argue that dissemination of the results of climate engineering research would make its deployment unacceptably more probable. Second, certain actions in the research process, such as the destruction of human embryos or animal testing, may be seen as inherently immoral. To its strongest critics, whether the action occurs within or outside of the research context matters little, if at all: If destroying a human embryo is wrong in the lab, then it is also wrong elsewhere. However, the law does, in fact, often distinguish based upon the scientific context. For example, research practices which may be permitted in the lab would be animal cruelty outside, due to the potential benefits of research. The challenge to developing regulation of these research actions will be primarily political, in that opponents of an action viewed as inherently immoral may be unlikely to compromise. To them, a law designed to minimise but not prohibit the practice may be seen as a tacit endorsement. It is unlikely that climate engineering research would be the subject of regulation or prohibition based upon the inherent immorality of the action. Even those who argue that climate engin eering deployment may be fundamentally wrong concede that its research may need to go forward. Finally, scientific research may negatively affect human health or the environment. Of course, some people give their informed consent to be affected, sometimes negatively, by an experiment. The oversight of human subjects research is perhaps the most established form of regulation of scientific conduct. More relevant to climate engineering research are externalities which pose risks to non-consenting third parties and the environment. As with the previous category, there is a strong legal case to be made that the scientific context is relevant, and that the positive external benefit of greater knowledge may outweigh the negative external risks to non-consenting people and the environment. This is not carte blanche for unregulated scientific conduct. The balance of these benefits and risks is the fundamental question of the regulation of climate engineering research.
Perhaps the best historical analogy to SRM is above-ground nuclear weapons testing. It carried significant risks to the health of humans, who essentially were non-consenting research subjects, and to the environment, including major irreversible harm. The tests operated under similar conditions of ignorance and post-normal science. Furthermore, as in the case of climate engineering, these risks needed to be balanced with others, such as that of a nuclear attack by one's opponents, and the benefits of reducing the risks. 98 However, above-ground nuclear weapons testing largely ended before the implementation of modern norms of human research subjects and environmental protection. 99 Thus, it is unclear how and whether such testing could be compatible with current bioethical standards.
V. TOWARD THE REGULATION OF SRM FIELD RESEARCH
In this section, I will highlight the background, specific strengths and challenges of a current effort to regulate SRM field research, namely the SRM Governance Initiative, emphasising claims to legitimacy and the definition of research.
Any regulatory regime for SRM field research must address the challenges described above in section III: It must minimise the risks to human health and the environment posed by experiments, and ensure that trials are as encapsulated and reversible as possible. To maintain ethical norms, it must obtain some form of consent from those who are placed at risk, while providing recourse for those who are demonstrably and significantly impacted. It must prevent commercial interests from unduly influencing the research in a manner contrary to the public interest. It must be flexible enough to adapt to a variety 98 Of course, given the dynamics of escalation and mutually assured destruction during the Cold War, the risk of attack may have been exaggerated, and the need for testing a self-fulfilling prophecy. of SRM proposals, a wide range of scales, and an evolving knowledge base. And it must perform these functions under conditions of ignorance, political volatility, and postnormal science. Unsurprisingly, the present actors in the policymaking arena differ over how to proceed toward regulation of SRM research. How wide a consensus is needed? Climate engineering research is occurring in only a few countries. Is agreement needed throughout the international community, or only among the capable countries? How should topdown and bottom-up approaches to developing regulation be balanced? Is a 'stamp of approval' from national governments or international bodies needed, or can the scientific community act on its own? How binding must regulation be? Are mere 'guidelines' acceptable?
Some observers believe that binding regulations are not only unnecessary, but could do more harm than good. They emphasise the present lack of knowledge and the absence of incentives for countries with the capacity for climate engineering to endorse a binding agreement. Furthermore, detailed constraints on behaviour now may prevent valuable research from occurring. Instead, such writers thus recommend the development of norms from the bottom up. 100 The Convention on Biological Diversity, as described above, may offer a vehicle for the regulation of climate engineering research. 101 Almost all countries are parties to it, and decisions of its Conference of Parties thus carry significant weight. However, the United States-the world's largest economy and leading site of research-is not a party. Furthermore, the CBD more closely resembles a framework treaty, and detailed obligations have thus far required further protocols.
Climate engineering scientists and advocates have already taken steps toward regulation of climate engineering research. In March 2010, they organised a week-long meeting at the Asilomar Conference Grounds in California in order to develop selfregulation, explicitly invoking early self-regulation by the first genetic engineering researchers, 102 which has been touted as a paragon of scientific responsibility. 103 the meeting met with strong criticism, from both inside and outside the climate engineering community, arising from a lack of transparency, concerns over personal commercial interests, and the limitations of self-regulation. 104 Consequently, the conference's legitimacy suffered, and it produced only a modest statement. 105 The conference leadership later produced five principles for climate change research: More recently, the UK's Royal Society, in partnership with a major US environmental organisation and the developing world's network of academies of science, launched the SRM Governance Initiative, which 'seeks to develop guidelines to ensure that geoengineering research is conducted in a manner that is transparent, responsible and environmentally sound'. 107 In contrast to the Asilomar meeting, it focuses on the regulation of SRM research, excluding CDR.
As the Asilomar process highlighted, the development of legitimacy presents a particularly difficult task in order for any regulation of SRM field research to be effective. Climate engineering carries such enormous risk and is so controversial that any regulatory regime must pass a high bar of legitimacy. State lawmakers, often a source of regulation with great legitimacy, have generally been quiet on the topic, potentially due to its political volatility. 108 However, legislation is not the sole claim to legitimacy. Robert Baldwin cites other means: accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency. 109 The SRM Governance Initiative may establish its legitimacy claim by emphasising expertise. Whereas the Asilomar meeting was a one-off event involving many individuals, almost entirely from industrialised countries, gathered under the banner of a largely unknown organisation, 110 the new project's convening partners are the world's oldest scientific academy (the Royal Society), the union of scientific academies of the developing world (TWAS), and a major environmental organisation (Environmental Defense Fund). Its working group further reinforces this expertise and diversity with, for example, representatives of other environmental organisations, and one-third of its members are from the developing world. On top of that, the working group contains prominent skeptics of climate engineering. 111 Another critical yet difficult requirement will be a definition of 'field research'. At the lower boundary, as laboratory and small field experiments increase in scale, at what point should they be regulated? The UK Science and Technology Committee proposed that small SRM field tests need comply only with a set of international principles (yet to be agreed upon), as long as the project has a 'negligible or predictable environmental impact' and 'no trans-boundary effects'. However, if assessment of potential impacts on the environment and human health is among the purposes of a novel experiment, how can negative effects be ruled out ex ante? A more precautionary approach may be justified, given the potential negative consequences and the condition of risk ignorance. The initial placement of the lower regulatory threshold at the transition from the laboratory to the field would be advantageous: It would be unambiguous, and it would identify any negative environmental or health effects better and sooner. If early experiments indicate de minimis risk, then the lower boundary could be raised.
How to define the upper end of research, distinguishing it from deployment, is less clear. If there is no sharp line between them, and if some scientists argue that relevant field research amounts to small scale deployment, how can regulation be limited to the former? 112 Could any definition prevent deployment from masquerading as research? 113 Analogous cases may be able to shed light on a path forward.
First, the development of drugs and medical devices proceeds through stages of clinical trials before approval. 114 Like SRM field tests, these trials operate in the environ-ment (ie, the human body) where they may eventually be utilised, and they carry significant risk. Furthermore, there is some lack of clarity at the upper boundary of research. In later stage clinical trials, research may provide medical benefits. Consequently, the actors have dual roles: Clinical researchers can be cast into the second role of physician, and research subjects seek to participate in experiments expecting therapeutic benefits, and can thus simultaneously be patients. 115 The clinical trials are generally reviewed by an institutionally-affiliated ethics board, while approval of the drug or device is done by national or EU regulators. 116 However, even after approval, post-marketing surveillance can further clarify the safety and effectiveness of the drug or device. 117 Second, genetically modified organisms are similarly tested in increasingly large trials, moving from the laboratory to the field. In the EU, for example, an extensive regime regulates and distinguishes among field trials, agricultural production, and consumption as food and feed. 118 There is a relatively clear upper boundary for research, in this case 'placing on the market' a GMO product. 119 Regulations address the need for public consultation; 120 labelling, traceability and valid methods of detection; 121 the coexistence of GMO and non-GMO agriculture; 122 and the avoidance of accidental transboundary movement. 123 Finally, research into ocean fertilisation, as described above, is newly regulated under international law. The IMO has developed a framework to determine whether a project is 'legitimate scientific research', which is based upon four criteria:
The proposed activity should be designed to answer questions that will add to the body of scientific knowledge … Economic interests should not influence the design, conduct and/or outcomes of the proposed activity …
The proposed activity should be subject to scientific peer review at appropriate stages in the assessment process … The proponents of the proposed activity should make a commitment to publish the results in peer reviewed scientific publications. 124 If the proposal is deemed to be legitimate, passes a six-point environmental assessment, and is not otherwise contrary to the London Convention and Protocol, it may conditionally proceed while being monitored. Although ocean fertilisation is a proposed form of CDR, it resembles SRM schemes in its risks of large transboundary environmental effects. Thus, the framework may be able to provide a precedent and model for making the distinction between research and deployment. 125 However, these cases are of rather limited utility. SRM field research has three characteristics, described above, which make its regulation challenging, yet these characteristics are not shared by these examples. First, effective outdoor research into SRM may require large scale testing, bordering on deployment, whereas the effects and risks of a drug, a GMO crop and ocean fertilisation can generally be assessed from experiments of a limited scale. Second, the potential consequences of experimenting with the earth's atmosphere and climate are greater than those posed by the examples. While the significance of injured research participants, genetic contamination and reduced marine biodiversity should not be belittled, I assert that SRM-even its field researchposes risks of a greater magnitude. Third, in all three cases, 'deployment' (ie, use beyond the test scale) is legally prohibited until research indicates that a particular application poses an acceptable level of risk to human health and the environment. Of course, an international moratorium on SRM deployment could address this gap, and will be needed in any effective regulatory regime for SRM research. 126 However, such a moratorium would need to define the boundary of scale between research and deployment, and thus presents something more like tautology instead of a step toward the regulation of research. See text to nn 44-47.
